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Foreword: Two Social Movements
Thomas W. Merrill*
Two social movements in the last fifty years have had a profound
impact on our understanding of law and the role of the courts in our
system of government. One is the civil rights movement. The demand
for greater racial and gender equality and other civil rights has
changed the face of the law in countless ways. For example, it has
called into question-or at least required a fundamental revision in-
the traditional understanding that the courts should interpret the Con-
stitution and laws in accordance with their original meaning. Deci-
sions such as Brown v. Board of Education' and the voting rights
cases2 appear to presuppose that the meaning of the law can change
over time as courts' perceptions of social exigencies change. The civil
rights revolution has also thrust courts deeply into the governance of
traditionally autonomous institutions such as local schools, election
boards, prisons, and mental hospitals.
There is a second social movement, however, that can also lay
claim to have transformed our conception of law and the role of
courts-the environmental movement. Environmentalism burst onto
the scene on Earth Day in 1970 and, despite some challenges to its
position, has not departed since. Although the influence of environ-
mentalism on the legal system has not been as pervasive as that of the
civil rights movement, it too has left its mark in many ways. For ex-
ample, environmentalism can take credit for the vast expansion in the
law of standing that took place in the early 1970's.3 Similarly, environ-
mental groups pioneered the use of "public interest law firms" as pri-
vate enforcers of public laws. As a consequence of these and related
developments, the environmental movement gave rise to a new and
much more aggressive style of judicial review of agency action, known
as the "hard look" doctrine.4 Environmentalism has also had an im-
pact on substantive legal norms, most prominently perhaps with re-
spect to causation, where courts have gone so far as to hold that
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
3. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. Students Chal-
lenging Regulatory Agency Proceedings, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971);
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
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liability may be imposed under the "Superfund" statute without re-
gard to any showing of causation of injury at all.5 Each of these inno-
vations has spilled over from environmental controversies to other
areas of the law.
The civil rights and environmental movements are linked in many
ways. But one theme that clearly unites these two movements is the
fundamental transformation they have brought about in the role of
courts in our society. Before the advent of these two movements,
courts played an essentially conservative role in the scheme of govern-
ment, acting as a brake on social changes emanating from politically
accountable legislative bodies. To be sure, courts often behaved in an
"activist" fashion in this period. By and large, however, it was an ac-
tivism in support of established social and economic interests. This
was true, for example, of the Marshall Court's expansive reading of
the Contracts Clause,6 the Taney Court's effort to make the world safe
for slavery,7 and the Fuller and White Court's attempts to invalidate
redistributive social legislation in the name of substantive due
process.
8
With the coming of the civil rights and environmental move-
ments, courts ceased acting as a brake on changes sought by demo-
cratic institutions and became themselves the agents of social change.
Rather than striking down or narrowly construing legislative innova-
tions in order to protect "vested" rights, courts became open fora for
groups seeking recognition of new rights going beyond what legisla-
tures were prepared to grant. True, this new progressive version of
judicial activism required at least the tacit support of the electorally
accountable branches. Many of the innovations spawned by the
courts were actively endorsed by the executive branch, and often they
were later codified by the legislature. But whatever public support
this program of social change through litigation may have garnered
after the fact, it clearly presents a new challenge to our understanding
of the role of the courts under the rule of law.
The part that environmentalism has played in producing this judi-
cial role-reversal poses a particularly daunting challenge for those who
would justify the new role of the courts. Although support for the
civil rights movement thrust the courts into an unfamiliar role as cata-
lysts of social change, that role could at least lay a claim to legitimacy
5. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
6. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
7. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).




in the great purposes of the Civil War Amendments, and in the tradi-
tion of judicial solicitude for "discrete and insular minorities" thought
to be poorly protected by the democratic political process.9 Environ-
mentalism can make no such claim. Modern environmental values
cannot plausibly be linked to the Constitution, no matter how broadly
construed. And environmentalists do not purport to represent a mi-
nority interest; rather, they claim to represent a diffuse majority.
Thus, the judicial assumption of the role of catalyst for social change is
especially difficult to justify in the environmental area. Indeed, the
fact that Congress soon responded to the environmental movement
with massive and detailed federal legislation makes many of the envi-
ronmentally inspired judicial innovations, such as expanded rules of
standing and hard look review, even more suspect.
The Federalist Society has long been at the forefront of those
questioning modern judicial activism and whether it is compatible
with the rule of law. As I have suggested, the environmental move-
ment has played an important role in the emergence of the modern
version of the activist judiciary, and presents an especially difficult
challenge for those who would justify such a judicial role. It is there-
fore fitting and proper that the Society should sponsor this symposium
on The Environment and the Law.
The pages that follow explore the broader jurisprudential impli-
cations of environmentalism from a variety of perspectives: conserva-
tive and liberal, normative and positive, academic, judicial, and
practical. The debate leads not only to some predictable points of dis-
agreement, but also to some surprising points of consensus. The
reader will find here wit and wisdom, truth and error, and more than
an occasional startling insight. Throughout-another hallmark of
Federalist Society gatherings-the discussion is always lively.
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the premises of the environ-
mental movement, or agrees or disagrees with the role of the modern
judiciary as an agent for environmental change, one cannot help but
attain a richer understanding of these fundamental issues by reading
the exchanges in this Symposium.
9. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
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